Two-way interconnection and the collusive role of the access charge by Ulrich Berger
Preprint manuscript No.
(will be inserted by the editor)
Two-Way Interconnection and the Collusive
Role of the Access Charge
Ulrich Berger
Vienna University of Economics, Department VW5
Augasse 2-6, A-1090 Vienna, Austria
e-mail: Ulrich.Berger@wu-wien.ac.at
September 2002 (First draft: August 2001)
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1 Introduction
The telecommunications industry has undergone rapid change in several as-
pects during the last years. The breakup of former state-owned monopolies
and deregulation in the local call market was in many countries accompa-
nied by exorbitantly high growth rates in the mobile telephony market. This
has shifted the focus of research in telecommunications to markets charac-
terized by two-way interconnection. In such a market, competing service
providers are typically interconnected, and part of their service consists of
terminating calls that originate on their rivals' networks. Since this is costly,
¯rms collect per-minute access charges (or interconnection fees) from each
other for termination.
From a regulatory viewpoint, an important issue is how to set these ac-
cess charges. It is commonly agreed that networks competing for customers
in linear retail prices should not be allowed to set their access charges non-
cooperatively. The reason is that this would result in a \double marginaliza-
tion" problem. Intuitively, by unilaterally increasing its termination charge,
a network can raise the marginal call costs of the rival network1. This trans-
lates into a higher rival's retail price, leading to a lower rival's market share
and a higher market share of the own network. In a noncooperative, sym-
metric equilibrium then, two equal networks will both charge high access
fees and high call prices, which may well exceed the monopoly price, if sub-
stitutability between networks is low. However, since network tra±c tends
to be symmetric, only the high prices enter into equilibrium pro¯ts, while
access charges received and payed out cancel. In sum, pro¯ts as well as
consumer surplus are low.
One way of alleviating the double marginalization problem is to impose
reciprocity of access charges, i.e. to demand that both networks charge the
same unit access fee. This can be achieved by a regulator setting an appro-
priate reciprocal access charge, or by letting the networks freely negotiate
over the access charge, subject only to reciprocity. In many OECD coun-
tries, interconnection arrangements are indeed handled in the latter way,
with regulatory intervention only if negotiations fail. Now, while collusion
over retail prices is illegal in general, cooperative agreement on the access
charge is allowed and often encouraged. This makes sense only if ¯rms are
not able to indirectly collude over retail prices by colluding over the access
charge. Unfortunately this is by no means obvious.
One has to be careful when judging the role of the access charge. The fact
that, due to tra±c symmetry, a reciprocal access charge does not explicitly
appear in equilibrium pro¯ts, does not mean that networks are indi®erent
about its level.2 Equilibrium pro¯ts do in fact strongly depend on the access
1 This is called the raise-each-other's-cost e®ect by La®ont and Tirole (2000).
2 Armstrong (1998) e.g. mentions a paper by the New Zealand Ministry of Com-
merce supporting this wrong intuition. It was termed the bill-and-keep fallacy by
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charge, but only indirectly, through the noncooperatively determined equi-
librium call prices which are a®ected by total termination costs, including
access charges.
In the second half of the 1990s, serious concerns have been raised in
the literature about ¯rms' ability to use a cooperatively determined access
charge as a collusion device (see e.g. Brennan (1997)). As noted already by
Katz, Rosston, and Anspacher (1995), networks have an incentive to agree
on a high (above marginal cost) reciprocal access charge in order to achieve
high end user prices. Together with the con¯rming results from the ¯rst
explicit models (see below for details on this literature), this has led many
researchers to adopt the view that collusion in the retail market is associated
with high access charges. This view was only slightly clouded by subsequent
opposite results arising from re¯nements of the basic models, which tried
to eliminate some of the less realistic assumptions of these models.
This paper is concerned with one particular assumption routinely in-
voked by the economic literature on two-way access. It is the assumption
that consumers do not bene¯t from receiving calls. I believe that this is
not only unrealistic, but also assumes away a potentially signi¯cant e®ect,
which arises if ¯rms can set di®erent prices for calls terminating on-net
and o®-net, i.e., if they use termination-based price discrimination { what
e.g. mobile telephony providers typically do. The reason for this is that
with termination-based price discrimination, if consumers care about being
called, their total surplus does not only depend on the prices o®ered by the
network they are subscribed to, but also on the price the rival sets for calls
into this network. Without this call externality, a network raising its price
for o®-net calls would only reduce volume demand of its own customers.
Taking into account the call externality makes clear that this also hurts the
rival's customers, and hence makes the rival less attractive to subscribe to.
This e®ect leads both networks to set higher o®-net prices than without
the call-externality. Indeed, if receivers' utility is su±ciently great, with lin-
ear pricing this may lead to equilibrium o®-net prices above the monopoly
level, accompanied by rather low on-net prices, even if the access charge
is equal to marginal cost. A decrease in the access charge then lowers the
o®-net price and raises the on-net price, so both prices move towards the
monopoly level. This, of course, raises pro¯ts, and consequently the collusive
level of the access charge is below marginal cost. Since this is also the case
for the welfare maximizing access charge, however, letting networks cooper-
ate in determining the access charge might even improve welfare compared
to cost-based access regulation.
If networks compete in two-part tari®s, it is known that even without
taking into account the call externality the collusive access charge is be-
low cost. If receivers' utility is accounted for, the same intuition as in the
linear pricing case leads to even lower collusive access charges. Hence for
competition in two-part tari®s, the cooperative choice of the access charge
is unambiguously below cost.4 Ulrich Berger
The overall impression from these results is that lifting some of the
unrealistic restrictions from the standard model makes high collusive access
charges appear rather the exception than the rule. It also seems as if the
marginal costs of call termination might loose their hitherto focal role in
the issue of regulating access charges.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the
literature on two-way interconnection and explains the phenomena related
to linear and nonlinear pricing, termination-based price discrimination, and
the call externality. In Section 3 I introduce the model of LRTb and the
speci¯c extension including the call externality in this model. Section 4
explains the notions of consumer equilibrium and network equilibrium. The
analysis of the model and the explanation of the diverse results starts with
the linear pricing case in Section 5, and continues with the nonlinear pricing
case in Section 6. A ¯nal discussion concludes.
2 Literature Overview
The ¯rst to show the negative welfare e®ects of cooperatively determined ac-
cess charges within an explicit model were Armstrong (1998), La®ont, Rey,
and Tirole (1998a){ henceforth LRTa, and Carter and Wright (1999). They
employ models where two networks are di®erentiated in the Hotelling style
and compete for customers in linear, nondiscriminating prices. The model
of LRTa is by now widely accepted as the \standard model" of two-way
interconnection, and most of the subsequent literature uses this model as a
starting point. Basic assumptions of LRTa's model include that consumers
do not bene¯t from receiving calls and that calling patterns are balanced.3
All these authors conclude that the negotiated access charge may be used
as a collusive device and will de¯nitely exceed the marginal cost of access.
2.1 Nonlinear Pricing
If networks may compete in nonlinear prices, e.g. two-part tari®s, this result
does no longer hold. As LRTa show, equilibrium pro¯ts are independent of
the access charge, leaving networks indi®erent about the price of intercon-
nection. The intuition is that although usage fees still increase with the
access charge, networks can counterbalance the negative impact on market
share by lowering the ¯xed fee. Thus competition remains strong, and the
access charge looses its collusive function.
Dessein (2001) studies a model where consumers di®er in volume demand
or subscription demand. He shows that introducing heterogeneity in volume
demand leaves the neutrality of the access charge una®ected. This result
3 A balanced calling pattern requires that, ceteris paribus, consumers are equally
likely to call customers of both networks, and hence the percentage of on-net calls
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is also supported by Hahn (2002). If demand for subscription is elastic,
however, some consumers may choose not to subscribe in equilibrium. As
Dessein (2001) and Schi® (2002) show, this leads networks to prefer an
access charge below marginal cost. The reason for this is the emergence of
positive network externalities in the absence of full participation.
2.2 Termination-Based Price Discrimination
The mentioned models do best describe local ¯xed-link telecommunication
networks. With the rise of mobile telecommunication, however, the prac-
tice of termination-based price discrimination became apparent. In mobile
networks it is commonly observed that di®erent prices are charged for calls
terminating in di®erent networks. Usually the price for calls terminating in
the same network where they originate (on-net calls) is lower than the price
for calls leaving the network (o®-net calls). Price discrimination of this type
creates positive (tari®-mediated) network externalities despite interconnec-
tion. Given the observed price structure, a consumer is the better o® the
larger the market share of the network he is subscribed to.
Termination-based price discrimination was already studied by Econo-
mides, Lopomo, and Woroch (1996). However, their results di®er substan-
tially from the results discussed below, since they assume that the subscrip-
tion decisions are made before prices are set, which renders market shares
e®ectively exogenous.
A seminal paper introducing price discrimination into the models men-
tioned above is La®ont, Rey, and Tirole (1998b), henceforth referred to as
LRTb4. Among other results they show that with linear pricing, the collusive
role of the access charge is reduced by the possibility of price discrimination.
The reason is that similar to the case of two-part tari®s above, a higher ac-
cess charge is re°ected in a higher o®-net price, but the building of market
share is not necessarily linked to an increase in the access de¯cit, since cus-
tomers can be attracted by lowering the on-net price. However, as opposed
to the nondiscriminatory, nonlinear pricing case, the collusive role of a high
access charge is not completely removed. Proposition 2 of LRTb states that
the access charge still locally acts as a collusion device, which means that
pro¯ts increase locally, if the access charge is increased above marginal cost.
As in the nondiscriminatory case, the corresponding result for nonlinear
prices is quite di®erent. Gans and King (2001) demonstrate that networks
competing in two-part tari®s with discriminating call prices will negotiate
a very low (below marginal cost) access charge in order to soften competi-
tion. They also conclude that the widespread \bill and keep" arrangements,
corresponding to a zero access charge, may be undesirable from the con-
sumers' perspective. As Cherdron (2000) notes, however, their result, pre-
4 A summary of the results of LRTa and LRTb is given in La®ont, Rey, and
Tirole (1997).6 Ulrich Berger
dicting o®-net prices below on-net prices, is somewhat at odds with what
can be observed in existing mobile networks.
Summarizing the above, while under nonlinear pricing networks are ei-
ther indi®erent about the access charge or prefer an access charge below
marginal cost, the work concerned with the linear pricing case unanimously
suggests that networks will negotiate a high access charge to maximize joint
pro¯ts. Subsequently, I will show that actually the opposite might be the
outcome of network competition in linear prices, and networks might well
make use of a reciprocal access charge below marginal cost. This result may
look similar to the one of Gans and King (2001), but there is an impor-
tant di®erence. While their result has been criticized for being out of line
with observed price structures, this does not apply to my ¯ndings, at least
in the linear pricing case. Access might be sold at a discount, but o®-net
prices still exceed on-net prices in equilibrium. Moreover, there turns out
to be little scope for regulatory intervention against \bill and keep" ar-
rangements. These arrangements might result from collusion, but then they
are also welfare improving compared with cost-based access pricing. How-
ever, for competition in two-part tari®s, the Gans and King (2001) result is
con¯rmed if receivers' utility is taken into account. The negotiated access
charge is always below marginal cost, and o®-net calls are cheaper than
on-net calls.
2.3 Introducing Call Externalities
All of the papers discussed above share the basic assumption that a call
generates utility only for the caller and not for the receiver. In this paper I
divert from this assumption by introducing call externalities. The obvious
point that a call generates utility also for the receiver has been recognized5,
but nonetheless widely neglected in the literature. Only recently, and in-
dependently from this work, Kim and Lim (2001), and Jeon, La®ont, and
Tirole (2002) have come up with similar models incorporating a call exter-
nality. However, they study a \receiver pays" system, where both the caller
and the receiver of a call are charged. Note that the receiver of a phone
call incurs the opportunity costs of the time the call takes. Hence he must
get some strictly positive utility from a call, otherwise he would not answer
the call. On the other hand it might be argued that at least on average the
utility of the receiver will be smaller than the utility of the caller. Whatever
the \real" average magnitude of receivers' utility, neglecting it is likely to
introduce a relevant distortion in the analysis of network competition.
First, however, it can be seen that under nondiscriminatory pricing the
analysis of competition remains unchanged6. It is clear that volume demand
is independent of any call externality. Obviously, nondiscriminating prices
5 DeGraba (2000) suggests that the total utility generated by a call is shared
equally between the calling parties. See also the discussion in Hahn (2001).
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also make the subscription decision independent of receivers' utility. Hence
neither subscription nor volume demand or pro¯ts are in°uenced by the
level of passive utility. This means that the results derived from the stan-
dard model of nondiscriminatory pricing discussed above carry over to the
extension we study here. The only deviation from LRTa's model arises in
the judgement of welfare implications. Indeed, neglecting the call externality
underestimates social welfare. To implement the social optimum, the price
of a call would have to be below marginal cost.
Volume demand stays of course independent of the call externality also
with termination-based price discrimination, but the subscription decision
is in°uenced if on-net prices di®er from o®-net prices. This is because the
utility from receiving calls contributes to the positive network externality
under on-net prices (say) below o®-net prices. An increase in a network's
market share raises the number of calls received by (and hence bene¯ts the)
subscribers of this network. In their subscription decision, consumers com-
pare the net utilities they receive from joining either network. If a network
raises its o®-net price, this has two e®ects. First, the net utility of this net-
work's customers decreases, and second, since these customers' demand for
o®-net calls falls, also the rival network's customers su®er, because they less
frequently enjoy the bene¯t of being called. This second e®ect lowers cus-
tomers' incentives to switch to the rival network. As the access charge, the
call externality is re°ected in equilibrium prices, which determine pro¯ts.
Indeed, if the utility of receiving calls is su±ciently high, the second ef-
fect explained above becomes so strong that networks will prefer an access
discount in order to keep the resulting o®-net prices below the monopoly
price.
This analysis rests on the assumption that pro¯ts are directly deter-
mined only by prices. Note, however, that in the case of two-part tari®s
pro¯ts also depend on the ¯xed charge. As mentioned above, this has a
deep impact on the nature of competition. The case of termination-based
price discrimination with two-part tari®s is analyzed in chapter 5:2 of Jeon,
La®ont, and Tirole (2002). Although their work is devoted to the receiver
pays system, they include a short study of their model in the absence of
reception charge, which of course coincides with a caller pays system. Inter-
estingly, they show that if receivers' utility is high enough (equal to callers'
utility), then for any given level of the access charge, the price for o®-net
calls in a symmetric equilibrium becomes in¯nite, resulting in connectivity
breakdown. The intuition for this is the following. Any o®-net call made
generates utility for the caller and the receiver. However, since only the
caller pays for the call, if receivers' utility is high, net surplus is higher for
the receiver than for the caller. This means that while raising the o®-net
price may decrease the direct pro¯t from o®-net calls, at the same time it
makes the own network more attractive, resulting in an increase in market
share. The total e®ect on pro¯t becomes positive, if receivers' utility is high.
Furthermore, if receivers' utility is high enough, the total e®ect on pro¯t is8 Ulrich Berger
positive regardless of the level of the o®-net price. This, of course, means
that the only equilibrium has an in¯nite o®-net price.
We conclude that the introduction of call externalities has a strong im-
pact on the outcome of competition in the case of termination-based price
discrimination. This is the case I study for the remainder of this paper.
3 The Model
In this section I introduce the model. It is based on the model of LRTb,
but for simplicity I neglect ¯xed costs (which does not change the results
qualitatively). On the other hand, I extend the model by adding the call
externality.
3.1 Cost and Price Structure
Imagine a market with two networks labeled 1 and 2. Both networks have
full coverage. The marginal cost of originating or terminating a call is c0 > 0,
and the total marginal cost of a call is c = 2c0 + c1, where c1 ¸ 0 is the
marginal cost of transmitting a call from the originating to the terminating
end. The reciprocal unit access charge is a ¸ ¡(c0 + c1)7. Networks either
compete in linear prices pii (for on-net calls within network i) and pij (for
o®-net calls originating in network i and terminating in network j), or, in
the case of two-part tari®s, also in the ¯xed charge Fi.
3.2 Subscription Decision and Demand
On the demand side there is a large number of consumers. A consumer can
be member of at most one network. From the consumers' point of view the
networks are horizontally di®erentiated as in Hotelling's model. The net-
works are located at the extreme points of the unit interval [0;1], and each
consumer is located at some address x 2 [0;1]. The total number of con-
sumers, normalized to 1, is distributed uniformly on this interval. The degree
of horizontal di®erentiation is measured by a parameter t corresponding to
the \transport costs". A consumer located at x faces a disutility of tjx¡xij
if he subscribes to network i, where x1 = 0 and x2 = 1 are the locations of
the two networks.
Consumers have homogeneous preferences for calls to other consumers.
Calls to di®erent consumers constitute independent goods and total utility
is additively separable. The utility from an active call of length q is given by
7 A negative access charge corresponds to subsidising termination. The subsidy
cannot be larger than the costs of originating and transmitting a call, however,
since otherwise a network could make pro¯ts by installing a computer which per-
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u(q), where u0 > 0 and u00 < 0.8 Consumers also get utility from receiving
calls. We denote the utility of receiving a call (passive utility) of length q by
a strictly increasing and strictly concave function ¹ u(q).
A consumer with income y, subscribed to network i and located at x,
making a call of length qout to some other consumer and receiving a call of
length qin from some consumer9, enjoys a total utility of
º0 + y + u(qout) + ¹ u(qin) ¡ tjx ¡ xij;
where º0 is some ¯xed surplus from being connected, large enough to guar-
antee full participation, i.e. to prevent consumers from not subscribing in
equilibrium.
The timing is as follows. First, networks cooperatively choose a recipro-
cal access charge, then they (noncooperatively) set on- and o®-net prices,
and the ¯xed charge, in case of two-part tari®s. Consumers choose a net-
work to subscribe to and then they choose the length of their on- and o®-net
calls.
Let q(p) = argmaxqfu(q) ¡ pqg be the consumer's demand, writing qij
short for the demand for on- and o®-net calls q(pij). Denoting by º(p) =
maxqfu(q)¡pqg net surplus, under price discrimination with given market
shares ®1 and ®2, network i o®ers its subscribers a total net surplus of10
wi = ®i[º(pii) + ¹ u(qii)] + ®j[º(pij) + ¹ u(qji)] ¡ Fi:
Letting hij = º(pij) + ¹ u(qji), we may write
wi = ®ihii + ®jhij ¡ Fi: (1)
4 Existence and Stability of Equilibria
4.1 Existence of Consumer Equilibria
For ¯xed prices, a consumer equilibrium is given if the market shares are
such that no consumer has an incentive to unilaterally switch to the other
network. If the market is cornered, i.e. if ®i = 1 for some i, then even the
consumer with the weakest preferences for network i (the consumer located
at xj) chooses to subscribe to this network. On the other hand, if there is a
shared market equilibrium with 0 < ®i < 1, then the consumer located at
x = ®1 is indi®erent between the networks. The market share ®1 = ® (and
8 For technical reasons I assume additionally that the Inada conditions u
0(0) =
1 and u
0(1) = 0 are ful¯lled, guaranteeing strictly positive and ¯nite demand
for all positive prices.
9 One could imagine that each consumer makes exactly one call to each other
consumer, and only the length of a call is variable.
10 Throughout this article let j = 3 ¡ i, if it appears on only one side of an
equation.10 Ulrich Berger
®2 = 1¡®) in a shared market equilibrium can thus be calculated from the
indi®erence condition





+ ¾(w1 ¡ w2);
where ¾ = 1=2t measures the substitutability between the two networks.





with Hi = 1=2+¾(hij ¡hjj +Fj ¡Fi). For a shared market equilibrium to
exist, H1 and H2 must have the same sign: H1H2 > 0:
4.2 Stability of Consumer Equilibria
In general, there may be multiple consumer equilibria for given prices. How-
ever, some of these can usually be eliminated by pointing out that an eco-
nomically meaningful equilibrium has to be stable with respect to an appro-
priate adjustment dynamic. Following the analysis in LRTb, we conclude
that generically there are either three consumer equilibria (the two cornered
market outcomes and an unstable shared market equilibrium), if both H1
and H2 are negative, or a unique, stable consumer equilibrium, which is a
cornered market one if H1H2 < 0, and a shared market equilibrium if H1
and H2 are positive.
4.3 Network Equilibrium
Imagine prices and the ¯xed charge are ¯xed and a corresponding stable
consumer equilibrium has been realized. If in this situation neither network
can gain by unilaterally changing its prices or ¯xed charge (taking into
account the dependence of consumer equilibria on these values), then these
values constitute what we call a network equilibrium. For the remainder of
this paper I concentrate on symmetric network equilibria.
5 Part I: Linear Pricing
First we examine the case of linear pricing, which means that networks are
not allowed to use a ¯xed charge. So in this section let F1 = F2 ´ 0.Two-Way Interconnection 11
5.1 Necessary Conditions for Symmetric Network Equilibria
Turning to the networks' pricing decisions, we ¯rst derive the pro¯t func-
tions. For given prices and a corresponding stable consumer equilibrium ®,
pro¯t of network 1 is given by
¼1 = ®2(p11 ¡ c)q11 + ®(1 ¡ ®)(p12 ¡ c)q12 + (a ¡ c0)(q21 ¡ q12);
and an analogous equation holds for ¼2. If we write
Mij = [pij ¡ c(1 + m)]qij + mcqji
for the unit pro¯t of network i (the pro¯t a single customer of network
i generates with one active call to and one passive call from network j),
denoting by m = (a¡c0)=c > ¡1 the (relative) markup on access, pro¯t of
network i can also be written in the form
¼1 = ®2M11 + ®(1 ¡ ®)M12:
Taking into account that Mii depends only on pii, the ¯rst order condi-























(1 ¡ 2®)M12 = 0;
and the respective equations for network 2.
Looking for a symmetric shared market equilibrium, where p11 = p22,

















Inserting from (2), rearranging terms, and with a little abuse of notation






(º0 ¡ ¹ u0)(p12)





(º0 + ¹ u0)(p11)
H1
: (4)
What can we infer from these equations about the prices in a stable
shared market equilibrium? First, note that M11, the simple unit pro¯t
(p11¡c)q11, is positive for p11 > c, and upward sloping for p11 < pM, where
pM denotes the monopoly price (for marginal cost c)
pM = argmaxpf(p ¡ c)q(p)g:12 Ulrich Berger
We also know that º0 + ¹ u0 < 0 and that H1 must be positive for the shared
market equilibrium to be stable. From (4) then follows that the unit pro¯t
M11(p11) has the same sign as its derivative. Hence, necessarily, c < p11 <
pM. In this sense the equilibrium on-net price is \well-behaved". This need
not be the case for the o®-net price. As equation (3) suggests, the sign of
@M12=@p12 depends on the sign of º0 ¡ ¹ u0, which may well be positive if
marginal passive utility is high.
5.2 Constant Elasticity of Demand




; ´ > 1;
from LRTb, which yields the constant elasticity demand function11 q(p) =
p¡´, indirect utility u(q(p)) =
´
´¡1p1¡´, net surplus º(p) = 1
´¡1p1¡´, and a
monopoly price of pM =
´c
´¡1.
Furthermore, I assume that the utility from passive calls is a ¯xed frac-
tion ¯ of the utility from active calls,
¹ u(q) = ¯u(q); with 0 · ¯ < 1:
With these speci¯cations, the ¯rst order conditions for network 1 can be

































I have intentionally written these equations so as to describe the recip-
rocal value of the o®-net price as a function of the reciprocal value of the
on-net price. This allows me to draw the graphs of the two functions, as is
done in Figure 1, and ¯nd all symmetric candidate equilibria as points of
intersection of the corresponding curves.
Let us ¯rst have a closer look at (5). The right hand side of this equation
is an a±ne linear function of p
¡1
11 , which depends on the parameters m, ´,
and ¯, but not on ¾. Its slope decreases with ¯, falling from (1 + m)¡1 for
¯ = 0 to zero for ¯ = 1=´ and approaching ¡(1 + m)¡1 for ¯ ! 1. At the






2¯´ + 1 ¡ ¯´
(1 + ¯´)pM =
1
(1 + m)pM ;
11 This is useful for deriving the quantitative results presented later on. However,
by continuity these results continue to hold qualitatively, if we depart from the










Fig. 1 The line given by (5) and the curve given by (6). Here, ¯´ < 1 and m > 0.
which is independent of ¯. Graphically this means that by increasing the












without passive utility (i.e. for ¯ = 0) equation (5) reduces to
p12 = (1 + m)p11;
the proportionality rule from LRTb. For ¯´ = 1, we get º0(p) ´ ¹ u0(q(p)),
that is, marginal net surplus of a network's own customers equals marginal
passive utility of the rival's customers for any level of the o®-net price. In
this case varying the o®-net price has no in°uence on the market shares,
since the positive and the negative e®ect exactly cancel out. Then it is
clearly optimal for the network to set the o®-net price to its monopoly level,
p12 = (1 + m)pM. This is re°ected by the line (5) becoming a horizontal at
this value for ¯´ = 1.
Turning to (6), we can see that this equation does not involve a, the
access charge. For ´ > 2, the right hand side of (6) is de¯ned only if the
expression in square brackets is nonnegative. The second term of this ex-
pression is a negative constant, it does not depend on p11. The ¯rst term is
positive for p11 < pM and { viewed as a function of p
¡1
11 { downward sloping
from its vertical asymptote fp11 = pMg to its minimum at p11 = c. For14 Ulrich Berger
p
¡1
11 > c¡1 the function given by (6) is strictly increasing and unbounded,
its slope converging to ´¡1=(´¡1) for p
¡1
11 ! 1. Furthermore, this function
is convex at least for values of p11 slightly below pM. The second term in
square brackets shifts the curve up (for ¾ ! 1) or down (for ¾ ! 0).
As noted, (6) has a negative slope in the relevant region c < p11 < pM.
Hence there exists at most one point of intersection with (5) in this region,
if the slope of this line is nonnegative, i.e. if ¯´ · 1. If ¯ exceeds 1=´, the
slope of (5) is negative, and there may exist two points of intersection).
However, the second point will be outside the relevant region if ¾ is small.
5.3 Second Order Conditions
The next proposition establishes the existence of a unique, stable, symmetric
equilibrium for low substitutability.
Proposition 1 If ¾ is small enough, there exists a unique, stable, symmet-
ric equilibrium. Its price constellation is given by the intersection of (5) and
the downward sloping part of (6).
Proof Consider the case ¾ = 0. Then the networks are monopolies and the
prices are at their respective monopoly levels. Graphically, (6) degenerates
to a vertical line at p11 = pM, intersecting (5) in p12 = (1 + m)pM. This
symmetric candidate equilibrium is thus unique and stable (since Hi =
1=2 > 0). Moreover, the market shares are constant for ¾ = 0. Hence, given




[(p11 ¡ c)q11 + (p12 ¡ c(1 + m))q12 + mcq21]:
This function is quasi-concave in (p11;p12), hence (pM;(1 + m)pM) is its
unique maximum. For positive values of ¾ the slope of (6) becomes ¯-
nite, this means that the candidate equilibrium on-net price falls below
the monopoly price. The candidate equilibrium remains unique for small
values of ¾, and by continuity of Hi in ¾ it remains stable. Also, by con-
tinuity of the market share in prices and in ¾, network 1's pro¯t function
remains quasi-concave. Hence the second order conditions are ful¯lled for
low substitutability. u t
This proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1 in LRTb. The result
is slightly di®erent, however, in the sense that the call externality prevents
the existence of equilibrium in the case of high substitutability, even for
a = c0. For example, if a = c0 (i.e. m = 0) and t = 0 (i.e. ¾ = 1), the curve
given by (6) admits its minimum at p11 = p12 = c. For any positive value
of ¯, however, (5) yields p12 > c at p11 = c, and hence there is no point of
intersection in the relevant region for large enough values of ¾.Two-Way Interconnection 15
5.4 Equilibrium Analysis
From now on I concentrate on the case where substitutability is low enough
to guarantee existence of a unique stable equilibrium. We then ask, in which
way the equilibrium depends on the various parameters of the model.
5.4.1 Comparative Statics The next lemma shows that while the on-net
price always decreases with the substitutability parameter ¾, the direction of
movement of the o®-net price depends on the strength of the call externality
and on the elasticity of demand. On the other hand, an increase in the access
charge always lowers the on-net price and raises the o®-net price.
Lemma 1 For ¾ > 0 and ¯ ¸ 0, the symmetric equilibrium prices given by
(5) and (6) are such that
(i) The on-net price decreases with ¾ and the o®-net price decreases with ¾
if ¯´ < 1, increases with ¾ if ¯´ > 1, and is constant at p12 = (1 + m)pM
if ¯´ = 1.
(ii) The on-net price decreases in a, while the o®-net price increases in a.
Proof An increase in ¾ shifts the graph of (6) upwards and does not in°uence
the graph of (5). The point of intersection thus moves to the right, i.e. p
¡1
11
increases. The vertical direction of movement depends on the slope of (5).
If ¯´ < 1 (this includes the LRTb case ¯ = 0), the slope is positive, so also
p
¡1
12 increases. If ¯´ > 1 the slope is negative and the intersection point
moves down, and if ¯´ = 1 the line is horizontal at p
¡1
12 = [(1 + m)pM]¡1.
Increasing a or, equivalently, m, shifts the line (5) downwards. Since (6)
slopes downward in the relevant region, the point of intersection moves
down and to the right. This means p11 falls and p12 rises. u t
In contrast to the result in LRTb, more substitutability exerts upward
pressure on the o®-net price, if ¯ is large enough. Intuitively, if the call
externality-induced negative e®ect of an increasing o®-net price on the ri-
val's customers is large, higher substitutability creates incentives for the
networks to exploit this e®ect and raise the o®-net price while lowering the
on-net price to compensate their own customers.
Remark Part (ii) of the lemma appears to contradict the corresponding
result of LRTb, since the case of no call externality is not excluded. LRTb
(p. 48) state that the o®-net price may decrease in a if ¾ is not small enough.
In their proof they give a numerical example for this phenomenon. However,
the values they provide (´ = 2 and ¾ = c = m = 1) lead to the candidate
equilibrium prices p11 = 1 = c and p12 = 2. A small increase in a then
does indeed decrease the o®-net price, but simultaneously the on-net price
falls below marginal cost and, as noted above, in this region any candidate
equilibrium is unstable and will therefore never be realized. In the region
c < p11 < pM, where the consumer equilibrium is stable, (6) is strictly de-





















Fig. 2 If ¯´ > 1, connectivity breakdown may occur for a high access charge.
5.4.2 Connectivity Breakdown For small ¾ > 0 the curve (6) cuts the
1=p11-axis, and the smaller ¾, the closer the intersection point lies to p11 =
pM. If ¯´ > 1, the slope of the line (5) is negative. Hence, by increasing
m we can shift the line down until it intersects the curve exactly at the
1=p11-axis (see Figure 2). Thus we have an equilibrium with 1=p12 = 0, or
p12 = 1. This proves the following lemma.
Lemma 2 For small ¾ > 0 and ¯´ > 1 there exists ¹ a, such that for a ! ¹ a
from below, p12 ! 1. The threshold ¹ a approaches in¯nity, if ¾ goes to 0 or
¯´ falls to 1.
This is the case of connectivity breakdown, which has already been ob-
served by Jeon, La®ont, and Tirole (2002) for the case of two-part tari®s.
The intuition is the same as in their case. If ¯´ > 1, then any o®-net call
bene¯ts the receiver more than the caller. Raising the o®-net price makes
the di®erence in net surplus smaller and hence increases the network's mar-
ket share. If a is large enough, then this increase in market share more than
o®sets the corresponding loss in direct pro¯t from o®-net calls for all levels
of the o®-net price. Hence it is optimal for the network to deter any o®-net
call by raising its price to in¯nity.Two-Way Interconnection 17
5.5 The Collusive Role of the Access Charge
Part (ii) of Lemma 1 states that varying the access charge results in the
equilibrium prices moving in opposite directions. We know that the equilib-
rium on-net price is always below the monopoly price. If this is also the case
for the o®-net price, the impact on pro¯ts of varying the access charge is
ambiguous. If, however, the o®-net price is above the monopoly price, both
prices will move towards the monopoly price (and hence raise pro¯ts) only
if the access charge is lowered. Imagine ¯´ > 1. This is not an unrealistic
case, since ´ > 1 and ¯ may well be only slightly below 1. The slope of (5)
is then negative, and for ¾ > 0 we have p12 > (1 + m)pM in equilibrium.12
Now let the access charge equal marginal termination cost, so m = 0. Then
the o®-net price exceeds the monopoly price, and we have the situation de-
scribed above. In order to maximize equilibrium pro¯ts, both networks will
negotiate an access charge a below c0.
If ¯´ = 1, the equilibrium o®-net price is (1+m)pM, independently of ¾.
For a = c0 then p12 is at the monopoly level, while p11 is below pM. Starting
from these values, a small decrease in a raises p11 towards the monopoly
price and thereby has a positive ¯rst-order e®ect on pro¯ts from on-net
calls, but only a second-order (negative) e®ect on pro¯ts from o®-net calls.
In sum, pro¯ts rise. By continuity this continues to hold if ¯´ is not too far
below 1. This shows that networks may prefer an access discount even for
¯´ < 1. For very low values of ¯, of course, this need not be the case.
Graphically, this can easily be seen if we keep in mind that since (6) is
independent from the access charge, networks can only shift the line (5) up
or down by varying the access charge. Thereby they can select any point on
(6), subject to the restriction m > ¡1. Maximizing pro¯ts, they will choose
the point where their isopro¯t curve is tangent to (6). The point of tangency
is unique, at least if ¾ is not too large, since (6) is convex in the vicinity of
p11 = pM and the equilibrium pro¯t function is quasi-concave in equilibrium
prices (the upper-contour sets of the isopro¯t curves are convex), peaking
at the \monopoly point" (1=pM;1=pM). It follows immediately that the
tangency point will lie northeast from the monopoly point, as illustrated
in Figure 3. This means that with the negotiated pro¯t-maximizing access
charge, both on- and o®-net prices are smaller than the monopoly price. If
the slope of (5) is negative or only slightly positive, of course, this implies
that this line intersects fp11 = pMg above the monopoly point. Hence [(1+
m)pM]¡1 > (pM)¡1, or m < 0. This analysis proves the ¯rst part of the
next proposition.
Proposition 2 Fix ¾ > 0 small enough. There exists 0 < k < 1 such that if
¯´ > k, networks will agree on an access discount, if ¯´ < k, networks will
negotiate an access markup, and if ¯´ = k, networks will agree on a = c0.
12 For ¾ = 0 the market consist of two separate monopolies and the optimality
of pii = pij = p












Fig. 3 Tangency points between (6) and the isopro¯t respectively isowelfare
curves. For small ¾, the welfare maximizing choice of a is below the pro¯t maxi-
mizing one, which in turn is below c0 if ¯ is not too small.
Remark The case ¯ = 0 is the case without passive utility, and I could in
principle just refer to Proposition 2 of LRTb. In this proposition they state
that for small ¾ > 0 (and for ¯ = 0) the pro¯t maximizing access charge
exceeds c0. While this statement turns out to be true, unfortunately their
proof is °awed13, so I give the correct proof here.
Proof It su±ces to show that networks will negotiate a markup on access if
¯ = 0. Given the analysis in the last paragraph, the second and third part of
this proposition then follow immediately from continuity of the negotiated
access charge in ¯´ and from the intermediate value theorem, respectively.
Note, that for a = c0 and ¯ = 0, the line (5) is the diagonal fp12 = p11g. By
symmetry of the equilibrium pro¯t function in p11 and p12, the slope of the
isopro¯t curves is equal to ¡1 all along the diagonal. The slope of (6) at the
13 In their proof, LRTb (p. 49) argue that for small ¾ > 0 their Lemma 2 shows
that both on-net and o®-net prices increase with the access charge. From this they
infer that starting from a = c0, a small increase in the access charge raises both
prices toward the monopoly level and therefore leads to higher pro¯ts. However,
actually their Lemma 2 (correctly) states that for small ¾ > 0 the on-net price
decreases in a. Hence it is not obvious that an increase in a does indeed raise
pro¯ts.Two-Way Interconnection 19
intersection with the diagonal, on the other hand, converges to ¡1 as the
point of intersection approaches the monopoly point, i.e. if ¾ ! 0. Thus, for
small ¾ the point of tangency is below the diagonal (see Figure 3), where
p11 < p12, and by the proportionality rule (recall that we are considering
¯ = 0 here), m > 0, i.e. a markup on access, is a necessary condition for
this. u t
Note that the last sentence of this proof also establishes that for small ¾,
the pro¯t maximizing point of tangency lies below the diagonal. Since net-
works will choose the access charge to let this point become an equilibrium,
we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 1 If ¾ is positive but small and networks may cooperatively de-
termine the access charge, then the resulting equilibrium prices will show a
markup on o®-net calls.
5.6 Welfare and the Socially Optimal Access Charge
From the social viewpoint, the optimal access charge is the access charge





[(1 + ¯)u(q11) ¡ cq11 + (1 + ¯)u(q12) ¡ cq12]: (7)
The unconstrained welfare maximizing choice of prices would yield prices
strictly below marginal cost for ¯ > 0. This is due to the call externality,
which is not internalized by the calling party when choosing volume demand.
To maximize welfare, the caller must be induced to extend the length (or
frequency) of his calls up to the point where marginal total utility created
equals marginal cost. This means (1 + ¯)u0(qij) = c and is induced by a
price of pij = (1 + ¯)¡1c. Of course these prices cannot be sustained in an
equilibrium, since then pro¯ts are negative.
Assume a benevolent regulator can set an arbitrary access charge subject
to the technical constraint a > ¡c0 ¡ c1. By symmetry, the iso-welfare
curves surrounding the unconstrained optimum have a slope of ¡1 along
the diagonal fp11 = p12g. Since the slope of (6) at the intersection with the
diagonal is smaller than ¡1 for small ¾, we can conclude that for small ¾ the
point of tangency of (6) and the iso-welfare curves lies above the diagonal,
and therefore also above the pro¯t maximizing point on (6), as shown in
Figure 3. This means that the welfare maximizing access charge is below
marginal cost and also below the pro¯t-maximizing access charge. Moreover,
I can show that the welfare maximizing access charge might actually fall
below zero. It follows from the additively separable form of (7) that the
iso-welfare curves have vertical tangents at p12 = c(1 + ¯)¡1. Since (6) is
a vertical line at p11 = pM for ¾ = 0, the point of tangency approaches20 Ulrich Berger
(1=pM;(1+¯)=c) as ¾ ! 0. Denoting the socially optimal access charge by
aw, this implies that (1 + a
w¡c0











It can be seen that the sign of aw depends on the relative size of ¯ and ´.




Thus the expression in brackets is negative, and so is aw. Similarly, if ´ · 2,
then the second factor in brackets exceeds 1=2 for any positive ¯, and again
aw < 0. The pro¯t maximizing access charge a¼, on the other hand, is
always positive for small ¾ > 0. We summarize this as follows.
Proposition 3




´+¯´ > 1, then aw < 0 < a¼ for small ¾. This includes the cases




´+¯´ < 1, then 0 < aw < a¼ for small ¾.
The more realistic of the cases (ii) and (iii) of this proposition seems to
be (ii), since it follows from ´ < 2. Note that in this case networks may ac-
tually agree on a \bill and keep" arrangement, which sets a = 0. This might
result from the consideration that in existing mobile phone networks, \bill
and keep" helps to save transaction costs of interconnection, a point not
included in my model. If transaction costs are substantial and were taken
into account, \bill and keep" might indeed turn out to be pro¯t maximiz-
ing. Note, however, that contrary to the view of Gans and King (2001),
from Proposition 3(ii) it follows that \bill and keep" is welfare improving
compared with cost-based access pricing.
In our model a higher level of substitutability may even lead to a perfect
alignment of networks' and the regulator's objectives. If the slope of (6) at
the intersection point with the diagonal equals ¡1, then, provided equilib-
rium still exists, this point maximizes pro¯ts and welfare simultaneously,
and the corresponding access charges coincide. For even larger values of ¾,
the order of these access charges will be reversed.
6 Part II: Nonlinear Pricing
In this section we examine the collusive role of the access charge under
nonlinear pricing, which here means competition in two-part tari®s. The
pro¯t equation for network 1 becomes
¼1 = ®2(p11 ¡ c)q11 + ®(1 ¡ ®)(p12 ¡ c)q12 + (a ¡ c0)(q21 ¡ q12) + ®F1:
As usual when competing in two-part tari®s, networks set prices so as to
maximize social welfare, and then extract consumer surplus via the ¯xed
charge. For the on-net price, the call externality is fully internalized by theTwo-Way Interconnection 21
network's pricing decision, while when setting the o®-net price networks
take into account the call externality induced negative impact on its market
share of a low o®-net price. This leads to prohibitively high o®-net prices if
¯ is large. Indeed, Jeon, La®ont, and Tirole (2002) derive the equilibrium
prices14
p11 = c=(1 + ¯); p12 = (1 + m)c=(1 ¡ ¯): (8)
Hence, as ¯ ! 1, the o®-net price goes to +1, resulting in connectivity
breakdown.
6.1 Pro¯t Maximizing Access Charge











Using equation (2), where H1+H2 does not depend on F1, we can solve for
the pro¯t maximizing ¯xed charge and ¯nd
F1 = 1=(2¾) ¡ (º11 ¡ º12) ¡ (¹ u11 ¡ ¹ u12) ¡ (p11 ¡ c)q11:
Inserting the equilibrium values of prices and the ¯xed charge into the pro¯t
equation and solving for the pro¯t maximizing access charge, we ¯nally get
m¼ = ¡
1 + 3´¯
1 + 2´¯ + ´
;
which for 0 < ¯ < 1 implies a¼ < c0. Hence, under two-part tari®s, networks
will invariably negotiate an access charge below marginal cost. This collusive
access charge is the smaller, the larger ¯ is. m¼ goes to ¡1 for ¯ ! 1
and approaches ¡1=(1 + ´) for ¯ ! 015. The resulting o®-net price p12 =
c
1+2¯+1=´ is always below the on-net price. Note, that while the o®-net price
for any given access charge goes to in¯nity when passive utility gets closer
and closer to active utility, this is not the case for the o®-net price resulting
from the collusive choice of the access charge (both the nominator and the
denominator go to zero in the second equation in (8)). The intuition for this
is of course that connectivity breakdown cannot be optimal for networks
that are maximizing joint pro¯ts.
14 They also show that a stable symmetric equilibrium exists, if ¾ is small and
a is not too far from c0.
15 For ¯ = 0 we get the result of Gans and King (2001). They do not use a
CED function and only state that the collusive access charge is given implicitly




¼)c). With our CED function q(p) = p
¡´ this is
equivalent to m
¼ = ¡1=(1 + ´).22 Ulrich Berger
6.2 Welfare Maximizing Access Charge
The socially optimal access charge aw would be the one giving rise to an
o®-net price of p12 = c=(1 + ¯). This is achieved by the (negative) markup





It can be seen that the socially optimal access charge is below marginal cost,
but always greater than the pro¯t maximizing access charge. We summarize
our ¯ndings in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 If networks compete in two-part tari®s, then ¡c0 ¡ c1 <
a¼ < aw < c0:
This shows that with two-part tari®s, setting the access charge at marginal
cost can never be optimal from the social viewpoint. On the contrary, from
the social viewpoint, \bill and keep" may not only be an improvement over




I have argued that taking into account the utility of receiving calls has a
strong impact on the outcome of competition between equals in the case of
termination-based price discrimination. In that case, if networks are not too
substitutable, I have shown that for su±ciently great levels of receivers' util-
ity, collusion over the access charge will result in access sold at a discount,
even in the linear pricing case. For the case of two-part tari®s, we derived
qualitatively the same results as Gans and King (2001) do, including the
anomaly of o®-net prices below on-net prices. However, with linear pricing,
on-net prices stay below o®-net prices in equilibrium, and the socially opti-
mal access charge may favor a \bill and keep" arrangement. In this light, re-
cently raised concerns about networks using high access charges as collusion
device appear unconvincing at least in the presence of termination-based
price discrimination.
It might be argued that the linear pricing case is of less relevance here,
because existing mobile telecommunication networks obviously do make use
of two-part tari®s. The usual arguments put forward in defense of linear
pricing is that the results of the standard literature on nonlinear pricing
resemble that of competition in linear prices as soon as one deviates from
the assumption of customer homogeneity in demand. The conjecture that
this will also be the case for models of two-way interconnection is e.g. found
in LRTa, LRTb, and Armstrong (1998). As mentioned in Section 2.1, Des-
sein (2001) has shown, in a model based on the LRTa model, that this
conjecture is not true if consumers di®er only in volume demand, and isTwo-Way Interconnection 23
even reversed if consumers di®er in demand for subscription. However, this
does not completely resolve the question of the real-world relevance of linear
pricing, since his model excludes the possibility of termination-based price
discrimination. What catches one's eye is that Dessein's (2001) second re-
sult (and the analogous result of Schi® (2002)) of collusive access charges
below cost resembles our main ¯ndings. Indeed, the intuition is similar in
spirit. In both cases the main di®erence to the LRTa model is that positive
network externalities are introduced. In Dessein's (2001) model a network
that lowers its price induces the market to grow, which through the network
externality bene¯ts not only this network's customers, but also the rival's.
Analogously in the present model, lowering the o®-net price bene¯ts the
rival's customers as well as the own customers. Therefore, in both cases,
prices tend to be too high in equilibrium, which in turn induces networks
to agree on a relatively low access charge to compensate these e®ects. This
seems to indicate that combining the two mechanisms at work by allowing
for customer heterogeneity in the present model would lead to an even lower
cooperative access charge, a point I would like to suggest for future research.
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